UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2496th MEETING: 11 NOVEMBER 1983

NEW YORK

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2496th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 11 November 1983, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. Victor J. GAUCI (Malta).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2496)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in the Middle East:
   Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/16036)

The meeting was called to order at 4.40 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/16036)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken at the previous meetings on this item, at the 2480th and 2495th meetings, I invite the representatives of Lebanon and Israel to take places at the Council table; I invite the representatives of the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Fakhoury (Lebanon) and Mr. Blum (Israel) took places at the Council table; Mr. Abdalla (Sudan) and Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: Before we hear the first speaker, I have been authorized by the members of the Council to make the following statement on their behalf:

> "The members of the Security Council wish to express their profound concern at the recent and current developments in northern Lebanon which have caused and are still causing widespread suffering and loss of human life. The members appeal to all parties concerned to exercise the utmost restraint and freely to seek to attain, and to respect, an immediate cessation of hostilities, to settle their differences exclusively by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force. The members of the Council highly appreciate the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and of the International Committee of the Red Cross in providing emergency humanitarian assistance to Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in and around the city of Tripoli. The members of the Council will continue to follow the situation in Lebanon with the greatest attention." *[S/16142.]*

3. The first speaker is the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

4. Mr. El-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from Arabic*): At the outset, Sir, I should like to express our great pleasure at your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. Your well-known extensive and accurate knowledge of international affairs, including the problem of the Middle East and especially the question of Palestine, assures us that, thanks to your wisdom and objectivity, you are eminently qualified to conduct the deliberations of the Council in a manner that will help it to discharge its commitments under the Charter of the United Nations before the international community. Your country may be small in area but its contribution in building a world culture cannot be measured simply by geographical size. The friendship binding our two countries makes us proud of your presence both as President of the Council and outside it.

5. I also take this opportunity to express to my colleague, Mr. Abdullah Salah of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, our great appreciation of the judicious, objective and courageous manner in which he conducted the work of the Council at a time when the majority of its membership was trying to oppose imperialist practices in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. We are proud of his presidency. There is a colloquial Arab verse which goes, "If I am disparaged by a knave, this speaks most eloquently for my perfection".

6. We have heard disparagement today and we are proud of the Arab representative who represents the Group of Arab States on the Council. Members know very well who the critic was who made the disparaging remarks. If you hear a knave disparaging me, this speaks most 'eloquently for my perfection'.

7. It has been said in the Council [*2495th meeting, para. 32*] that the President behaved in a certain way in 1954. In 1954 Israel was not in occupation of the whole of Pales-

tine; it was not in occupation of the Golan Heights; it was not in occupation of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and southern Lebanon. This is the difference. If Charles Malik, despite our reservations, had been in the presidency instead of the representative from Jordan he would have behaved in the same judicious and objective way.

8. If there is anything we hold against the Council it is that we expected the United States, when the question of Grenada was before the Council, not to take part in the voting inasmuch as it carried out the invasion and an invading State cannot participate in the voting. This is our understanding of the Charter and of, I think, Article 27. A State that is party to an aggression or conflict cannot vote in the Council. That is our reservation. Naturally the representative of zionism here, through his immediate superior, Mr. Shamir, publicly supported the invasion of Grenada. The statements are before us. If we are to be objective, delegations of States that commit aggression should not participate in the voting and thus demonstrate to us their objectivity.

9. As we said in a previous meeting, the delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic did not want to speak on the occasion of the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). At the time, we responded to the Israeli statement made during the 2480th meeting of the Council, held on 18 October, which was replete with misinformation.

10. Today, the Syrian Arab Republic is the subject of another feverish campaign which is different from its predecessors only in the determination to create various pretexts to avoid the implementation of Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982). Resolution 509 (1982) demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally from all Lebanese territory to the internationally recognized boundaries.

11. We have asked to be allowed to speak at a very critical moment. American circles are unleashing direct threats at various levels. Those threats presage a joint Israeli-American aggression against Syria, Syrian forces and Lebanon. There is no doubt that you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council have been concerned at statements accompanied by acts of aggression against Syrian forces and Lebanon's sovereignty. No doubt, the Council as the body charged with the maintenance of international peace and security must have thought that those threats and provocations against the Syrian Arab Republic threaten not only our security in Syria, Lebanon or the region but also international peace and security as a whole. The Council no doubt realizes that the threat to international peace and security in the Middle East region will have direct far-reaching effects on the interests of all the peoples of the world and especially the interests of the Western States.

12. Today the Eastern Mediterranean region is witnessing the mobilization of the largest American armada seen by the world since the Second World War. There are no fewer than 30 warships that have assumed an aggressive posture in Lebanon's coastal waters, 3 aircraft-carriers and 300 sophisticated warplanes. Representatives must have wondered about what is behind the presence of these large numbers. We must have all wondered why this should happen when the Lebanese factions are earnestly doing their utmost to achieve a national consensus in order to put an end to the civil war.

13. What is striking is that the American mobilization and the provocations accompanying it are timed to coincide with Israeli mobilization, in addition to the irresponsible threats that sometimes amount to madness—all of which are actions designed to undermine the process of Lebanese national consensus, a consensus which is considered a prequisite for reviving Lebanon and saving it from the anarchy from which it has been suffering in the wake of the Israeli aggression that started on 4 January 1982 and still continues.

14. Naturally, I cannot speak for the representative of Lebanon, who is here. I was scheduled to speak after him.

15. The show of force, whether by Israel or the United States, is a threat to the security of Lebanon, Syria and the Arab region. In addition, it is an attempt to undermine the independence, unity and sovereignty of Lebanon. It is an encouragement to Israel to persist in its occupation of southern Lebanon. Israel has actually taken measures to separate occupied southern Lebanon from the rest of the country, even in the theatre of operations, which indicates that Israel is putting the final touches on its expansionist schemes in the area. These schemes are not new to representatives; they were laid down during the First World War and presented as an integrated scheme for expansion in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. The details of this scheme were published in 1954 in Sharett's memoirs about the period. We have already indicated in the Council the details of the Zionist scheme aimed at the annexation of southern Lebanon and need not repeat them now.

16. In addition to all those facts, which are an open secret, the representative of zionism sets himself up, falsely and fradulently, as a defender of Lebanon and of its independence and sovereignty. Thus, he changes the Council's demand, in its unanimously adopted resolution 509 (1982), that Israel withdraw forthwith and unconditionally into what he called, in his statement at the 2480th meeting of the Council, the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of the non-Lebanese forces. In other words, he arrogates to Israel the right to occupy parts of Lebanon and place Lebanon in a subservient status, in accordance with an agreement rejected by the Lebanese and Arab peoples. That agreement was imposed upon the Lebanese people by force of arms—and that is no secret.

17. We have repeatedly declared that we will not leave Lebanon an easy prey for Israel. We have repeatedly declared that Syrian forces will not withdraw from Lebanon until the last Israeli soldier has been withdrawn unconditionally, and the independence and unity of Lebanon, as an integral part of the Arab nation in the full sense of the word, has been guaranteed.

18. Actually, the Geneva talks among the Lebanese parties have reached that conclusion, since Lebanon can only be Arab, in accordance with its real identity, not the American or Israeli identity which imperialism is trying to impose upon it by force through occupation and multinational aggression.

19. The conspiracy which is being hatched against Lebanon and Syria was recently outlined in the wake of the visit to Israel of Eagleburger, the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs of the United States Department of State. There is a so-called revived strategic agreement with Israel. Israel is the base for American imperialism, and America is the leader of this imperialism. The strategic co-operation agreement did not die and does not need revival, yet it is said that it is to be revived. That means escalating the strategic co-operation to the stage of aggression. That is our concept of this strategic co-operation and its revival.

20. This agreement is based on an understanding between the two parties to commit an imminent aggression, co-ordinated between Washington and Tel Aviv, against the bastion of Arab steadfastness embodied in Syria and against the nationalist forces in Lebanon. The recent American aerial provocations are but a link in the series of terrorist acts committed in deed and in words against our Arab people in our area. We say to America and Israel that Syria is not Grenada, which was an easy prey, and that we shall defend our Arab land and the dignity of our nation with all our might. We are certain that the United States of America, which is behaving in an irresponsible, reckless manner, will not achieve its aims. Our history is replete with evidence that all aggressors have been repelled. We are certain also that all the peoples of the world will stand by us and support us against this new imperialist onslaught, and that the new Arab solidarity will soon emerge and prove itself once more. Our Arab nation is fully conscious of the risks attendant on the return of the Arab homeland to the American sphere of influence. It is the influence of exploitation, oppression, Zionist expansion, the plunder of Arab riches, the humiliation of peoples and the imposition of restrictions on their liberty.

21. In brief, our Foreign Minister speaking in the General Assembly on 28 September this year stated our clear position, which is based on the following principles:

> "First, Lebanon's unity, independence and sovereignty are among the principles whose violation or infringement can never be accepted by Syria and the other Arab States. The Arab States will keep working towards that end and assisting the brotherly Lebanese people to recover their national unity and independence and sovereignty over all their territories. In this regard, we contributed to the achievement of the agreement concluded a few days ago between the opposing sides in the civil war in Lebanon. Secondly, Israel must withdraw unconditionally from Lebanon, in accordance with Security Council resolution 509 (1982). Thirdly, the agreement imposed on Lebanon must be overturned, since this agreement was imposed under the shadow of occupation. Any agreement imposed under occupation or through the use or threat of force is considered null and void. In this connection, it must be pointed out that no attempt of any kind to bring about the implementation of this ill-omened agreement can succeed. We shall stand by our people in Lebanon in their struggle until that agreement is thwarted. Fourthly, the multinational forces must leave Lebanon, because they have gone beyond their declared objectives and are posing a grave threat to peace and security in the region. They remind us of the colonialist expeditions in previous stages of the history of our region."[1]

22. Mr. LICHENSTEIN (United States of America): It is a particular pleasure, Sir, for my delegation to welcome you, both personally and as a representative of a small but important Member State of the United Nations, to the presidency of the Council, for this month. You have so often and in so many ways demonstrated your prudence, your wisdom and your skill that we look forward to your presidency as a productive one and one that will reflect credit on yourself, your country and the Council.

23. I wish also to express the warm thanks and the keen and genuine admiration of my delegation to your predecessor, the representative of Jordan, who presided over one of the most difficult, one of the most exhausting, agendas that has ever befallen the Council in the several years that I personally have been a participant. As we have so often said before, you have a tough act to follow and we wish you well.

24. My delegation had, probably naively, assumed that the thrust of today's meeting would be a follow-up and completion of our consideration last month of the renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL or that it might concern itself with certain procedural problems that were left hanging at the conclusion of the deliberations, or both, but owing to the tender mercies of, particularly, the representative of the Soviet Union and also more recently of the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, the focus of our discussion has gone rather far afield. I wish to comment on only one or two aspects of their statements.

25. The representative of the Soviet Union spoke this morning of the "demonstration of military muscle" by my Government [*ibid., para. 47*]. He and the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic have referred to "threats", "provocative acts" and "intimidation" by my Government. We threaten no one. We engage in no provocative acts. As for intimidation, of course, intimidation is largely in the eye of the beholder and indeed in the backbone of the observer. I leave the question of intimidation to others.

26. We listened carefully to the statements made by the representatives of those two Governments as regards threats, provocation and intimidation, as we always listen carefully to the words uttered by experts in the matters that they address, words uttered by those well practised in threats, provocation and intimidation.

27. I have said that we threaten no one and we intend no provocation. But my Government would wish no one to be misled, would wish no one to misunderstand our intentions in Lebanon. And we would not wish anyone to mis-

understand our resolve in fulfilling our intentions. The forces of the United States are present in Lebanon at the express invitation of the Government of Lebanon; their purpose in Lebanon, along with the forces of three other countries, is simply stated: it is to work with that Government and to assist it in every way possible in the rebuilding of its domestic institutions and in the extension of its sovereignty throughout its territory, which must, of course, ultimately involve the withdrawal of all—I repeat, all—non-Lebanese forces from the territory of Lebanon.

28. So long as the forces of the United States are present in Lebanon under these conditions and in order to discharge these tasks—and they will remain there until these tasks are discharged—they will defend themselves against unprovoked attack from whatever quarter and by whatever means are deemed appropriate by the authorities of the United States.

29. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Israel.

30. Mr. BLUM (Israel): We have heard the two useful and helpful statements of the representative of Syria, the first on 18 October [*2480th meeting*] and the second today, and I say advisedly "useful and helpful" because the representative of Syria has finally clarified for all of us, including those who pretended to be ignorant in the past of the intentions of his Government, that Syria does not intend to withdraw from Lebanon.

31. In my statement on 18 October I made explicit reference to the demand voiced by the President of Lebanon from the rostrum of the General Assembly last year in which he called for—and I quoted him then and I am going to quote him again: "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon."[2]

32. I also made reference on 18 October to the letter of 2 September 1983 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigration of Lebanon to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States [*S/15953, annex*] requesting the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon. The Minister repeated this demand in his statement in the general debate in the General Assembly.[3]

33. All this is being brushed aside by the representative of Syria. For us there is no surprise in this because we have known all along that Syria has had, for all these years, expansionist and annexationist intentions with regard to Lebanon. But now the mask has been removed and the truth is there for all of us to see. Therefore I say in all sincerity that we are grateful to the representative of Syria for his statement, and I believe the entire Council must be very grateful to him for it.

34. One who must certainly be grateful to him for his statement is the representative of Jordan, because he has been given a clean bill of health by the representative of Syria. Incidentally, I am also grateful for the Arabic proverb which he brought to our attention. I indeed believe that if a knave disparages me I must be right.

35. The statement of the representative of Jordan was predictable enough. As we all anticipated, he did not address himself to the issues raised in my statement earlier today [*2495th meeting*]. He told us, very predictably, that it was beneath his dignity—I wish he had cared for the dignity of the Chair last month as much as he cares for his own dignity—and he left it at that, basically. So in actual fact he only confirmed what I had to say earlier today. He certainly confirmed it when he told the Council—he really had the audacity to tell the Council—that he thought I did not have the right to speak here. That is precisely what he wanted to effect in his abuse of the Chair last month. That is why he invoked the lateness of the hour, 1.55 p.m. There was nothing wrong with that. What was wrong was that he did not set a date for a resumption of the debate—that afternoon, or the following morning, or the following afternoon. Well, the reason is now clear: he thinks I have no right to speak here. That is the proper exercise of the functions of the Chair. So in fact, by his statement today, he has only further compounded his misbehaviour. He had an excellent chance to show some remorse, to apologize to the Council for what he did last month. He did not utilize that chance. Instead, he embarked on a discourse on Israel being a non-peace-loving State. This is a favourite theme of his.

36. Since the resolution he referred to was adopted before his arrival here, I should like to acquaint him with certain facts. The resolution he referred to was adopted by such peace-loving States as Cuba, Iraq, Libya, the Soviet Union, its puppet régime in Kabul, Syria, Viet Nam and so on. Here at the United Nations, in this theatre of the absurd, all these countries masquerade as peace-loving States and, as I said at the time, it is indeed a badge of honour for my country to be branded by these countries a non-peace-loving State. The fact is that all the 21 States which voted against that shameful and shameless resolution were democracies, the leading democracies in our world. Not surprisingly, Mr. Salah's country was not among them.

37. I should like to say a few words also in response to the second statement by the representative of the Soviet Union in this debate.

38. I tried last time—unsuccessfully, it appears—to remind the representative of the Soviet Union that what was on our agenda was the extension of the mandate of UNIFIL. He departed last time from the agenda, and he decided to proceed on the same lines today. He raised certain questions. He knows very well that there are answers to those questions which are linked to certain other questions. Indeed, I made him an offer a long time ago. I have certain questions to ask of him, and once he has been good enough to reply to them he can be assured that our answers to his questions will be instantly forthcoming. He has not obliged me today with answers to my questions. I should therefore like to repeat some of them.

39. I ask the representative of the Soviet Union, the leader of the peace camp in our world, when his country's peace-loving tanks are going to leave Afghanistan. How

many more Afghan civilians will have to be killed by peace-loving Soviet troops before he will indicate his country's willingness to leave Afghanistan alone?

40. This is my next question to the representative of the Soviet Union: when will his country be ready to release from their bondage the various nations that it has enslaved over the past 38 years? I do not have to name those nations—first, because the list is a very long one and I do not want to detain the Council and, secondly, because the list is well known to all of us.

41. I should like also to ask the representative of the Soviet Union—and this is closer to his home: when will his Government be ready to grant the peoples of the Soviet Union their fundamental human rights and freedoms? In other words, when will his country cease being a totalitarian dictatorship? This is an important question because it has far-reaching repercussions for the peace of the world, including peace in the Middle East.

42. My next question is: when will the Soviet Union cease its attempts to subvert and destabilize various régimes throughout the world—mainly through mercenary régimes that it maintains in various regions? More specifically, when will the Soviet Union give up the attempts it has been making for three decades now in the Middle East to destabilize our region? This question, of course, concerns me most directly as the representative of a country in the Middle East. For, the Soviet Union has been instrumental in every escalation of tension in the Middle East over the past three decades, and certainly in recent weeks, through the introduction of huge quantities of sophisticated weapons and armaments and through the dispatch of thousands of "advisers" who now grace with their presence the invading armies of Syria in Lebanon. So when is this type of peacemaking by the Soviet Union going to cease in our region? As soon as it does cease, it will become much simpler to answer the questions he asked of me, because then we shall be able to sit down with our neighbours, unhampered by foreign interventionists from outside the region, to negotiate all the outstanding issues between us and them.

43. I conclude with two specific questions. Could the representative of the Soviet Union tell us whether the Soviet "advisers" currently in Lebanon with the Syrian army of occupation have obtained the necessary Lebanese visas? And, given the vast quantities of Soviet arms and ammunition in Lebanon, could he tell this Council whether the necessary import licenses have been obtained from the Government of Lebanon; and, if so, would he be good enough to produce at least one copy of such an important license?

44. The PRESIDENT: I believe that I have given all concerned every opportunity to state their views, and I hope that we shall be able to finish our meeting this evening in good time and in good order.

45. I call again on the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

46. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I apologize for speaking once again, but I do so because I feel, as everyone else here must feel, that an attempt has been made to ascribe to me words that I did not use.

47. As usual, the representative of world zionism here claimed that I had said that the Syrian Arab Republic would not withdraw from Lebanon. I did not say that. He would like me to have said it. He would like to interpret my statement in a way compatible with the expansionist aims of Israel. But I said no such thing. I quoted from the verbatim record of the Council's meeting on 18 October, where I had read out a statement made by the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Mr. Hafez al-Assad, in an interview with Swiss television. This statement is in the record for the representative of world zionism to read [*2480th meeting, para. 87*], but it seems that there is political illiteracy here—deliberate illiteracy. I shall quote again one passage from the statement by the President of the Syrian Arab Republic: "Israel must withdraw from Lebanon"—is that not compatible with resolution 509 (1982)?—"There is only one foreign army in Lebanon, and that is the Israeli army" [*ibid.*]. Can anyone deny that the Israeli army is a foreign army? If for the sake of argument we agreed that the Israeli army was not a foreign army, then the multilateral force is not a foreign force but an Arab or an Israeli force.

48. I repeat what I have already said: Israel must withdraw from Lebanon, since there is only one foreign army in Lebanon and it is the Israeli army, which came there as an invading force. Who invaded Lebanon? Did the Syrian Arab Republic invade Lebanon? Has the Security Council forgotten and has Israel forgotten that on 6 June 1982 the Council adopted a resolution calling upon Israel to withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon? [*Resolution 509 (1982).*]

49. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978, was there a Syrian invasion? In its resolution 425 (1978) did the Council not call upon Israel to withdraw from Lebanon to internationally recognized boundaries? The Syrian forces are in Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese Government. The same paragraph of the verbatim report of the meeting of 18 October continues: "Israel has its own language and systems, in no way linked to Lebanon or any other Arab country" [*2480th meeting, para. 87*].

50. How can Israel be linked to Lebanon or to any other Arab country? It is an imported entity, a synthetic entity. How can it belong to the area when it has nothing to link it to Lebanon or to any other Arab country? The same paragraph continues: "The Israeli forces must withdraw from Lebanon without imposing any conditions on that country. The withdrawal of the Israeli forces will help to put an end to the Lebanese disputes, with the help of the Arabs" [*ibid.*].

51. Is there anyone in the world who doubts that the withdrawal of the Israeli forces will facilitate the solution of the Lebanese conflict, with Arab assistance? Have not

the Arab deterrent forces—that is, the Syrian forces—come to Lebanon in accordance with the wish of the Arabs?

52. The President said, with respect to the Syrian forces—and here I request the previous speaker to listen well so that he will not misquote me:

> "As far as the Syrian forces are concerned, the Syrian forces are prepared to withdraw at the request of the Lebanese Government after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces"—Does that mean that Syria will not withdraw from Lebanon; did I say that?—"because then it would be a request resulting from a decision by the Lebanese Government and not from Israeli pressure because of Israeli occupation in Lebanon." [*Ibid.*]

This is because we do not see that such a request, however it is made, can come from the will of the Lebanese—not as a result of Israeli pressure—as long as the Israeli occupation of Lebanon continues.

53. In other words, the text is very clear. The representative of Israel cannot interpret texts in accordance with his expansionist schemes. The Lebanese decision must be a free one. The freedom of the Lebanese decision stems only from the freedom of Lebanon, that is, through the full Israeli withdrawal and the lifting of the American hand from Lebanon.

54. It has been said that Syria receives military assistance. Naturally Syria receives military assistance. How can Syria not defend itself against the war machine, against the Israeli arsenal, which is nurtured by the United States with billions of dollars? Is not self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, a natural right guaranteed for every State? Can Syria produce by itself the weapons to enable it to defend itself, while it is a developing State? Can Israel produce the American weapons by itself? No. The proof of this is found in *The New Times* of today, 11 November, under the heading "House Votes Aid for Israeli Plane":

> "American aid allocated to Israel for the 1984 fiscal year totals $2.61 billion, including 1.7 billion in military credits and $910 million in economic grants. Of the military credits, $850 million does not have to be repaid."*

55. Israel is a mendicant State, which lives off American aid—not off American loans, but off American aid—and off Arab properties and Arab resources and riches—and we are told here in the Council not to defend ourselves. The same article in *The New York Times* continues as follows:

> "This is the largest amount of aid ever approved for Israel. Last year, it got $2.485 billion."*

56. Can anyone challenge, as the representative of zionism did, our right to import the means for our self-defence from any place we wish? We import them from the party that combats expansionism, racism and aggression in the world. We do not import them from those who commit aggression against Grenada and plan to commit aggression against Nicaragua and commit acts of violation of Arab airspace and waters.

57. Moreover, Israel, through the American Government, is now competing with American companies in the manufacture of American aircraft in the occupied Arab territories—which is to say, Israel and the other occupied Arab territories. *The New York Times* went on to say:

> "The Lavie issue has been sharply disputed behind the scenes here. Some American companies, such as Pratt & Whitney and Grumman, which stand to gain from work on the Lavie, have supported the use of American funds. Other companies, such as Northrop, which view the Lavie as a competitor, have been opposed, particularly since the F-20, Northrop's fighter, has not been financed by the Government."*

58. The paper, which is not known for its friendliness towards the Arabs—it is controlled by world zionism, and this is no secret—continues:

> "The General Accounting Organization, the Congressional watchdog agency, said in a report last summer that the research and development costs for the Lavie are estimated in excess of $1.5 billion."*

59. Israel has become a place where American weapons are manufactured under Hebrew names and compete with American weapons which benefit the American Government through the sale of the weapons to other peoples to fight among themselves. This is the truth.

60. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Lebanon, on whom I now call.

61. Mr. FAKHOURY (Lebanon) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I thank you, Sir, for giving me the opportunity to make my statement and I wish you success in carrying out your task as President of the Council for the month of November. Your well-known wisdom and competence will be invaluable to the Council. I wish also to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Abdullah Salah, for having guided the work of the Council so skilfully last month.

62. We asked to speak at the Council's meeting on 18 October [*2480th meeting*] in exercise of the right of reply because we wished to put our position on record when the deliberations were diverted from the original subject—the extension of the mandate of UNIFIL—and developed to encompass other issues which in our judgement have a bearing on the sovereignty of Lebanon.

63. Today we note that the insistence on such a diversion still exists. This has strengthened our belief that it is

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

necessary to set out the position of Lebanon on what is being said, and on what has been said in the past, without indulging in polemics—a practice we hold to except when we are forced to speak out so that our silence may not be interpreted as approval of acceptance.

64. Lebanon's position can be summarized as follows. First, Lebanon holds firm to its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and to the unity of its people. Secondly, the events which have taken place on Lebanese territory and are still taking place today are unquestionable proof that the war that has been raging for nine years is not, as some wish to portray it, an internal war, but a war of regional ambitions and conflicting international interests. Thirdly, the Government of Lebanon is determined to ensure the withdrawal of all unauthorized non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon. As for the multinational forces, UNIFIL and the international observers, we confirm that their presence in Lebanon is at the request and with the approval of the Lebanese Government. Fourthly, the international community and, especially, the Security Council are called upon—today, not tomorrow—to assist the Government of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of those unauthorized non-Lebanese forces, because this will relieve Lebanon of human tragedies, destruction and economic deterioration and protect the security and peace of the region and the world from the danger of war. Fifthly, the delegation of Lebanon, and that delegation alone, has the right to speak here in the name of Lebanon about Lebanon's future and about what it wants and what it rejects.

65. I say this in order to remove any doubt or misunderstanding that may have arisen as we listened to some of the representatives who appointed themselves caretakers of the interests of Lebanon in place of the Lebanese themselves, or to representatives who consider themselves to be more sincerely interested in the future of Lebanon and its security and stability than even the people of Lebanon themselves.

66. There are no, and shall be no caretakers of Lebanon except the Lebanese themselves, and no one shall be allowed to speak on behalf of Lebanon except its legitimate representatives.

67. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The representative of the United States in his statement today said that the United States was not threatening anyone and that it had no intention of invading or attacking anyone. Those statements of his are in contradiction with the words and, more important, the deeds of the United States Administration.

68. In recent months all of us have seen some pretty ominous phenomena. As the military machine of the Pentagon is beginning to get up steam, and as American factories are churning out ever-increasing numbers of missiles, aircraft and tanks, the American philosophy is becoming more and more frank and open. In recent months at least five new postulates have appeared in the American philosophy. They are the following. The first postulate is that the world must be divided into spheres of influence and, furthermore, spheres of influence of the Western Powers. For this candour we are obliged to the President of the United States. The second postulate is that the United States has the right to conduct subversive operations against any country of the world whose régime is not to the liking of the United States. The author of this postulate is the President of the United States. The third postulate is that the Charter of the United Nations permits the United States to intervene, primarily in Grenada. For this postulate we may thank the permanent representative of the United States. The fourth postulate is that the list of American interventions has only just begun and may be continued. The authors of this postulate are the President of the United States and the United States Secretary for Defense.

69. All of this is nothing other than the philosophy of force, the philosophy of the jungle. The Administration that proclaims this philosophy and pursues a policy in accordance with it assumes full responsibility before mankind.

70. As for the statement of the representative of Israel, generally speaking, I need not necessarily answer him. After all, in the strategic partnership between Israel and the United States Israel is, as everyone knows, the junior partner, and the master has already been answered by me.

71. Nevertheless the representative of Israel intrigued me with some very concrete points he made about some very concrete issues. In particular, for example, he asked about the question of visas, and he also raised the question of permission for the import of arms. I am ready to continue to discuss these matters with him. But let the representative of Israel first show me Lebanese visas in the passports of Israeli soldiers now occupying southern Lebanon; let the representative of Israel show me the permission issued to it by the Lebanese authorities for the Israeli imports of the American weapons that are now to be found in southern Lebanon.

72. Mr. SALAH (Jordan) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I am very grateful for the statement made by the Israeli representative this afternoon. So as to avoid the impression being given that he has a just cause, I should like to inform the Council that the best way in which we can answer Israel and reveal its nature and intentions is to draw attention to that statement by the Israeli representative himself. His statement this afternoon was explicit in that regard. Hence we see no need to prevent the Israeli representative from speaking continuously.

73. As for Israel's concern regarding the Council's importance, and Israel's respect for the Council, those can be judged from the Israeli representative's absence from the Council chamber to accept the invitation that you, Mr. President, extended to him to take a place at the Council table. He continues to abuse the opportunity that has been granted him. He proved that a short while ago, and in his last statement.

74. He once again repeated shop-worn talk about my person and the presidency of the Council last month in a

slander campaign aimed at diverting the Council from its agenda. Here I would record my thanks to those who have had sufficient moral courage to express objectively and honestly their awareness of that fact in this chamber.

75. In his last statement the representative as usual avoided the main problem that is engaging everyone's attention and threatening international peace and security. He merely insulted the Council. I think that it is an affront to the Council and to its presidency, whoever the President may be, that he should be allowed to be so bold as to insult the Council and its presidency in this manner.

76. Israel's respect for the Council and for the United Nations—and Israel was established by the Organization—was evinced long ago. We recall what the Israeli representative said on the eve of the unanimous adoption of a resolution condemning the Israeli raid against the Beirut International Airport on 31 December 1968 [*resolution 262 (1968)*]. When the Israeli representative submitted his Government's response to that resolution, he said:

> "The resolution reflects the moral, political and juridical bankruptcy of the Security Council in respect of the Middle East situation."* [*1462nd meeting, para. 118.*]

That was said by the representative of Israel in 1968, and that is what the representative of this entity has been repeating now in terms of substance and spirit.

77. Lastly, I can objectively make no better response to the Israeli representative than to re-read paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution A/ES-9/1, which I quoted this morning [*2495th meeting*] and in which it is stated that the General Assembly:

> "Declares that Israel's record and actions confirm that it is not a peace-loving Member State and that it has carried out neither its obligations under the Charter nor its commitment under General Assembly resolution 273 (III) of 11 May 1949;".*

78. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Israel.

79. Mr. BLUM (Israel): Irrespective of the number of interventions that the representative of Jordan may make, nothing will erase from the memories of the members of the Council and of public opinion outside the Council, which watches the proceedings in this Council, the gross misconduct that he displayed last month.

80. As I have already had occasion to say, he had the opportunity today to apologize to the Council. Instead he has posed as the defender of the Council's interests. He is apparently unable to justify his behaviour. He hides behind hollow generalities.

81. We are, of course, not surprised that, in accordance with the custom here, various speakers today dutifully congratulated him on his many virtues of last month, on his fairness, his impartiality, his honesty, his decency—any combination will do, especially when certain opportunists join the bandwagon. It was something different from what some of those representatives had to say about his behaviour in private.

82. With regard to the representative of the Soviet Union, I should like him to be advised that Israel signed with Lebanon an agreement on 17 May providing, *inter alia*, for the full withdrawal of Israel to the international boundary between our two countries, within the context of the agreement and subject to the fulfilment of all its provisions. I should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union, does his country have an agreement of this kind with Afghanistan, for example, and, if so, what does it provide for? When does his country intend to remove the Soviet forces of aggression from that country? And what about the other countries that have fallen under Soviet sway all these years? Have they been assured by the Soviet Union of the restoration of their independence?

83. We could go on endlessly with these questions, and I should like the representative of the Soviet Union to note that the questions that could be asked of his Government are indeed legion. And there are many questions for which his Government has to answer the international community.

84. The PRESIDENT: As I said this morning, there were many items that the Security Council had to discuss last month, and therefore the time of the Council was taken up with those substantive issues. I hope that we are now finished with the procedural aspect of our debate.

85. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The representative of Israel is interested in continuing the discussion, in the Security Council and throughout the world. But we want to put an end to the discussion. For this, it would suffice that Israel withdraw its troops from all Arab territories occupied since 1967.

86. Mr. SALAH (Jordan) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The representative of Israel has given me the opportunity to apologize for what he calls my bias. I would say that Israel has missed dozens of opportunities to demonstrate its love for peace and it intention to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories.

87. As to his remarks, made as though he were divulging what was said to him in confidence by any other representatives I need only recall what has been said in public about the representative of Israel and about that entity itself.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

NOTES

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 9th meeting, para. 144.

[2] *Ibid., Thirty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 35th meeting, para. 10.

[3] *Ibid., Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 14th meeting, para. 315.

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Litho in United Nations, New York 00300 90-60205—August 1992—2,050

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2497th MEETING: 17 NOVEMBER 1983

NEW YORK

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NOTE

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2497th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 17 November 1983, at 11.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Victor J. GAUCI (Malta).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2497)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:
   Letter dated 15 November 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16147);
   Letter dated 15 November 1983 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16150);
   Letter dated 15 November 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Greece addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16151)

The meeting was called to order at 12 noon.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

Letter dated 15 November 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16147);

Letter dated 15 November 1983 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16150);

Letter dated 15 November 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Greece addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16151)

1. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Greece, India, Romania, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Yugoslavia, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Iacovou (Cyprus), Mr. Haralambopoulos (Greece) and Mr. Kirca (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Woolcott (Australia), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka) and Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of all the members of the Council, myself included, I wish to extend a warm welcome to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus and Greece, who have graced us with their presence in the Council chamber and who are prepared to take part in this important debate.

3. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. As representatives know, we are gathered to discuss a very serious situation, having direct repercussions on the fate of a small island, a Member of the United Nations. Cyprus, unfortunately, still suffers from suspicion and division. Mercifully, thanks to the presence of United Nations forces and to the restraint which they encourage, the island at present is free from the strife and conflict that engulfed it not so long ago. It is of paramount importance that utmost restraint should continue to be exercised by all concerned, both in Cyprus and in neighbouring countries, as well as in this chamber.

4. I would ask all representatives here to join in a sincere effort to enhance the process of reconciliation and peace and to do full justice to the positive potential of the Council in collectively helping to advance our common objective to bring lasting peace to the island, on the basis of previous decisions of the Council, which has already enunciated the relevant considerations. No one would benefit more from reconciliation in Cyprus than all the Cypriot people and Cyprus' immediate neighbours.

5. The Council is meeting today in response to requests contained in letters addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 15 November 1983 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [*S/16147*], the representative of Cyprus [*S/16150*] and the representative of Greece [*S/16151*].

6. Members of the Council have the following documents before them: S/16148, a letter dated 15 November

from the representative of Turkey addressed to the Secretary-General; and the following letters dated 16 November addressed to the President of the Security Council: S/16152, from the representative of Turkey; S/16153, from the representative of France; and S/16155, from the representative of Greece.

7. I now call on the Secretary-General, who wishes to make a statement.

8. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have asked to speak in order to provide Council members with information that they may find relevant to their consideration of the item on the agenda. The matter before the Council concerns the announcement in Nicosia, on 15 November, of the proclamation of a Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the issuance of a declaration in which that entity is described as an independent State. I was informed about the announcement by a letter dated 15 November, which Mr. Denktaş, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, handed on that day to my Special Representative, Mr. Gobbi, for transmission to me. The text of that letter, with annexes, has been distributed as a document of the Council [*S/16148, annex*] at the request of the representative of Turkey.

9. Upon receiving Mr. Denktaş's letter, I authorized the United Nations spokesman to issue the following statement on my behalf:

> "The Secretary-General deeply regrets the announcement of a 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. He considers that this move is contrary to the resolutions of the Security Council on Cyprus and at variance with the high-level agreements of 1977 [*see S/12323, para. 5*] and 1979 [*see S/13369, para. 51*]. It is bound to affect adversely the situation in Cyprus and to complicate the efforts of the Secretary-General to promote an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem under the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council. The announcement has been made at the moment when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General has arrived in Cyprus to initiate consultations in preparation for the high-level meeting suggested by Mr. Denktaş with the object of paving the way for a resumption of serious intercommunal negotiations.
>
> "The Secretary-General is in consultation on this serious development with all concerned, including the President of the Security Council. In the mean time, he appeals to all those involved to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action that may further aggravate the situation."

10. I have little to add to that statement. As the members of the Council are aware, I met in New York with President Kyprianou on 30 September and with Mr. Denktaş on 1 October to discuss the soundings I had initiated in August in order to give effect to my strengthened personal involvement within the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Council. Mr. Denktaş at that time suggested that I convene a high-level meeting for the purpose of clarifying the intentions of the two sides for a federal solution and paving the way for a resumption of the inter-communal talks on the existing agreed basis. I promptly transmitted that suggestion to President Kyprianou and discussed it further with him on 6 October. For my part, I made it clear to both leaders that I would be happy to lend my good offices to arrange for a high-level meeting, provided it was well prepared and provided both sides would co-operate in ensuring its success. I felt that a meeting of that kind could provide the opportunity for a firm recommitment by both sides to a peaceful negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem through the inter-communal talks on the existing agreed basis. I also felt that such a recommitment should enable both sides to avoid needless controversy and focus instead on making a serious effort to achieve substantive progress towards a settlement.

11. Having received from my representative encouraging reports on his preliminary contacts with both sides in Nicosia, I decided to initiate consultations on this subject with the parties concerned. Mr. Gobbi arrived in Cyprus on 14 November with my instructions to commence this process on my behalf by consulting both sides on the agenda. It was my hope that arrangements for convening the high-level meeting suggested by Mr. Denktaş could be completed at an early date.

12. Against this background, I must once again express my deep disappointment at last Tuesday's action. However, Mr. Denktaş has informed me that his proposal for a high-level meeting under my auspices remains valid and that my good offices and the negotiations must continue.

13. I wish to emphasize my appeal for restraint. As the members of the Council know, we are fortunate to have the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) stationed in the island. According to UNFICYP reports, access to the north was temporarily stopped prior to the issuance of the Turkish Cypriot announcement on 15 November. The Force Commander, General Greindl, placed the Force on increased vigilance as of 1300 hours. The Turkish checkpoints were reopened shortly thereafter. The situation in the island and along the cease-fire lines supervised by UNFICYP remains calm. By its presence, UNFICYP provides us with a measure of assurance that the current problems will not be allowed to disturb the calm that has prevailed in Cyprus for a number of years.

14. It is evident that the chances of success of our efforts depend primarily on the co-operation of the parties and on their willingness to engage in serious negotiations. Since the beginning of the current crisis, I have been in constant contact with all concerned and with my Special Representative in Nicosia.

15. I am determined to pursue my efforts in order to weather the present crisis and, if possible, induce the parties to return to the search for an agreed, just and lasting settlement. With this end in view, I propose to utilize to the

utmost the presence here at the United Nations of high-ranking representatives of all concerned.

16. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker for this morning is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Mr. George Iacovou. I welcome him and invite him to make his statement.

17. Mr. IACOVOU (Cyprus): Mr. President, I should like to thank you and the members of the Security Council for giving me the opportunity to report on an escalating act of the continuing Turkish aggression against my country, the purported declaration of independence of that part of Cyprus at present under Turkish occupation.

18. A few years ago, in February and March 1975, the Council was urgently convened [*1813th to 1820th meetings*] to condemn the unilateral Turkish decision of 13 February 1975, which declared that a part of the Republic of Cyprus, the one occupied by the Turkish army, would become a so-called "Federated Turkish State". The Council adopted resolution 367 (1975) condemning that action. It also called upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and urgently requested them, as well as the parties concerned, to refrain from any action which might prejudice that sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment, as well as from any attempt at partition of the island.

19. The Council has convened today to consider condemnation, in the strongest terms, of this new Turkish move tantamount to an attempt at the partition of Cyprus, to declare that act null and void, and to call on all Member States not to recognize this nullity.

20. The Turkish leadership, trying to stir up among Turkish Cypriots feelings of hatred and enmity towards their Greek Cypriot compatriots, has not hesitated to repeat, especially in recent months, its favorite but completely unfounded allegations about usurpation of the rights of Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots and about the "Turkish Cypriots' right to self-determination", trying to create the atmosphere necessary to justify a partitionist policy through secession.

21. Ankara and its agents in Cyprus have been speaking of the Turkish Cypriots' right to self-determination. This right, however, must be exercised by the population of a country as a whole and not by each community separately, for if what Ankara and Denktaş are claiming is applied internationally, many States in the world would be fragmented. Moreover, is it not a contradiction in terms when Ankara and its agents speak of the exercise of this right in the part of the country which is under the absolute control of foreign occupation troops?

22. Recent Turkish attempts to alter the agreed basis and the nature of the intercommunal talks by introducing the notions of "peoples" and "equality" were in essence not referring to the dialogue itself but were, in fact, an attempt to prepare the ground for their unilateral act of 15 November for the secession and for partition of Cyprus.

23. Furthermore, the principle of self-determination is well established in the United Nations, and it certainly cannot be interpreted in such a way as, *inter alia*, to impair the territorial integrity of any State. Would the Turkish Government accept that different communities are entitled to separate self-determination? Would they like us to remind them of the situation in their own country and the implication of such an application of the doctrine there? As regards the "equality" claim, the Cyprus Government believes in the equality of all Cypriots and in the total absence of discrimination of any kind. We accept that each citizen has equal rights and equal opportunities. But to accept that 18 per cent of the population equals the 82 per cent of the population would strike at the roots of democracy and the balance upon which a federal State is to be based.

24. Since the Turkish aggression against my country in July and August 1974 and the continuing occupation of part of its territory by the military forces of Turkey, the Security Council and the General Assembly have repeatedly dealt with the Cyprus problem, and they have both established, through numerous resolutions, the framework for a just and viable solution.

25. These resolutions demand the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus, considering this as an essential basis for a speedy and mutually acceptable solution of the Cyprus problem. They demand the immediate and effective implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX), unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 1 November 1974 and endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, and of the subsequent Assembly and Council resolutions on Cyprus, which provide the valid and essential basis for the solution of the problem of Cyprus.

26. They deplore the fact that part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is still occupied by foreign troops. They deplore all unilateral actions that change the demographic structure of Cyprus by the implantation of settlers from Turkey into the occupied areas or promote *fait accompli*. They express full support for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. They affirm the right of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus and its natural and other resources. They call upon all States to support and help the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to exercise these rights and condemn any act which tends to undermine their full and effective exercise.

27. The resolutions deplore the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks and call for meaningful, result-oriented, constructive and substantive negotiations, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions and the high-level agreements. They call for respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots, including the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to property, and the instituting of urgent measures for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes in safety.

28. They consider that the *de facto* situation created by the force of arms should not be allowed to influence or in any way affect the solution of the problem, and they call upon the parties to refrain from any unilateral action which might adversely affect the prospects of a just and lasting solution of the problem of Cyprus by peaceful means or which violates or is designed to violate the independence, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. The latest General Assembly resolution, 37/253 of 13 May 1983, welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to pursue a renewed personal involvement in the quest for a solution of the problem and requested him to undertake such actions or initiatives as he may consider appropriate within the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council.

29. Of all the provisions of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, Turkey has chosen to pay lip service only to the one which refers to negotiations. For many years now the Turkish side has claimed to place the emphasis for the solution of the Cyprus problem on intercommunal talks. Yet they have not given any explanation as to why they refused to attend the talks at the end of May 1983, on the day fixed by the United Nations for their resumption. Similarly, they have given no reason why their various proposals were so separatist and so devoid of substance as to necessitate the intervention of the then Secretary-General to save the talks from total collapse. And over the whole period of intercommunal talks, in contrast to the attitude of the Greek Cypriot side, which was to negotiate meaningfully and in good faith, the Turkish position has been one of delaying tactics and meaningless proposals, thus leading the talks to a virtual impasse, whilst preparing the ground, through a series of unlawful measures, for secession.

30. We must not lose sight of the fact that the presence of the occupation forces over the past nine years constitutes an insurmountable obstacle in the free search for a solution of the Cyprus problem through constructive and meaningful negotiations, as stipulated in the United Nations resolutions and the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979.

31. Every day that has passed, one further step has been taken by Turkey to destroy the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus and to convert the occupied part into a province of Turkey. It was after the visit of the Prime Minister of Turkey, Bulent Ulusu, to the occupied areas of Cyprus in May 1982 that Ankara's decision to establish a so-called Central Bank and a so-called Development Bank in the occupied territory of the Republic was announced. It was after the visit of Denktaş's colleague, Mr. Cagatay, to Ankara last year that Ankara's decision to abolish the Cyprus pound and to introduce the Turkish Lira as "legal tender" in all transactions in the area of the Republic occupied by the Turkish forces was also announced. Furthermore, they proceeded to issue so-called title deeds to the usurpers of the Greek Cypriot properties, including to soldiers from the occupying forces of Turkey and to settlers from Turkey. With these so-called certificates, the usurpers would be able to rent this property, sell it, mortgage it and "distribute it to their children", as the Turkish Cypriot press revealed.

32. The same unacceptable attitude is unfortunately demonstrated by the Turkish side in the purely humanitarian question of missing persons. This issue was discussed at length in the Third Committee at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and the Cyprus Government position there was thoroughly substantiated by irrefutable evidence. Nine years have elapsed, and we are still trying to trace the fate of more than 1,600 persons missing since the invading forces set foot on Cyprus. In spite of unflagging efforts, in spite of a number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, no progress has been made on this purely humanitarian issue.

33. Furthermore, the occupied areas of Cyprus have been colonized by the importation from Turkey of alien populations, in furtherance of Ankara's plans to change the demographic structure of Cyprus. These colonizers even created a "political party" and its leader, a settler and former Colonel of the Turkish Army, Mr. Ismail Tezer, became a so-called minister in Denktaş's régime. In a press conference on 22 December 1978 he openly declared that the aims of his "party" were to "achieve the partition of Cyprus and its annexation to Turkey". On 17 August 1981 he admitted that the settlers came to Cyprus with the approval of Turkey, that they were presented as an "agricultural force", that almost all of them became citizens of the so-called Turkish Cypriot State and that "their purpose was to stay forever in Cyprus".

34. The objectives of these actions have been deplored by the Turkish Cypriots themselves. The Turkish Cypriot leader and former Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Fazil Küçük, wrote in an article in his newspaper *Halkin Sesi* on 24 May 1978 that these settlers "turned this paradise island into hell".

35. As regards Ankara's sinister plans against Cyprus, they are becoming more and more manifest every day. Its plans are to wipe out any trace of Greek Cypriot rights in the occupied part of Cyprus, to partition the island and to annex, *de facto*, the occupied territories of Cyprus, thus satisfying for the present its geopolitical objectives. All its illegal and inhuman actions and tactics are motivated by this overall objective, and its deeds speak louder than its words. We submit a few of the many provocative and secessionist statements made 20 years ago by Turkish officials against Cyprus' independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. Mr. Kemal Satir, former Vice-President of Turkey, in a public statement in 1964, said, "Cyprus will be divided into two sections, one of which will join Turkey." Hardly a few months later, in September 1964, the former Prime Minister of Turkey, Ismet Inonou, addressing the Turkish National Assembly, said, with reference to the Geneva talks of that year, "Officially we promote the federation concept rather than the partition thesis so as to remain within the provisions of the Treaty." This is another clear indication of the tactical nature of the use of federation as an official camouflage for partition.

36. That the ulterior aim of partition is annexation transpires from the newspaper *Halkin Sesi*,—the mouthpiece of Mr. Küçük, then Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus—which in its editorial of 9 August 1965 wrote:

> "Cyprus is nother Alexandretta in the history of Turkey. The power of Turkey will ensure an honourable life for the Turkish Cypriots in the same way as it did in Alexandretta by annexing it and bringing it under Turkish domination. The road in this direction has been opened by the Turkish fighters at Kokkina, who are now fighting in every corner of Cyprus."

37. Furthermore, in a recent long interview in the Turkish paper *Tercuman* of 30 July 1983, Mr. Melih Esenbel, former Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, former Turkish Foreign Minister and former Turkish Ambassador to Washington, who played a role in the Zurich and London Agreements,[1] revealed Turkey's real intentions towards Cyprus, admitting that behind its partitionist designs on Cyprus were its own strategic considerations.

38. Mr. Esenbel explained how Turkey, which had abandoned every claim on Cyprus in 1923, became party to the Cyprus problem with enormous and patient work. He further stated that Turkey accepted only those proposals which were leaving the door open to separate self-determination and partition and subsequently rejected all those proposals, including one by the then Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, when they realized that "the road leading to *taqsim*"—partition—was closed. They accepted Macmillan's plan only when they were given assurances that "the right to self-determination will be used" and thus the road to *taqsim* too would be opened. He also revealed that Turkey's Prime Minister Menderes gave them instructions in Zurich "to find a formula which will ensure the possibilities of Turkey's security", because "it is becoming obvious that at this stage we will not be able to achieve *taqsim*". Mr. Esenbel further stated that "according to the *de facto* situation, it is clear on the territory itself and not on paper as to how the Cyprus problem will be solved".

39. On 20 July 1980—the sixth anniversary of the invasion—Mr. Turan Günes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the time of the invasion, openly declared that "Cyprus is valuable as a right arm for a country interested in its defence or for its expansionist aims". Mr. Günes took it a step further and admitted that "many States to a certain extent, because it suits their interests, want to see the Cyprus problem as our desire to protect the Turkish community on the island, whereas the actual problem is the security of the 45 million Turks in the motherland".

40. The Turkish Cypriot population, which is also suffering under the Turkish military occupation, has many times voiced its concern over the separatist and partitionist attitude of the Turkish side. Indicative of that concern is a recent statement made by Mr. Orhan Kahya, leader of the Turkish Cypriots who crossed to the occupied areas of Cyprus in 1975, as published in the Turkish Cypriot magazine, *Olay*, on 8 March 1982. He said: "Presently even the Turkish Cypriot women are exerting efforts to go to their properties in the south and the women are being prevented from doing so". He added: "The reason why the people insist on going to the south is that they have properties there...; now they live in misery in the north".

41. Let the world not be misled by false allegations by the Turkish side that before the invasion the Turkish Cypriots were suffering or that they were forced out of the Government. The leader of the Turkish Cypriot Trade Union, DEV-IS, Mr. Hasan Sarica, refuted that allegation when he stated that:

> "In the pre-1974 era, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots worked together in a brotherly manner and the economic position of the Turkish workers was excellent.... After 1974 the economic position of the Turkish Cypriot workers substantially deteriorated.... In pre-1974 Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots worked together and shared the same economic profits. The conditions of life of the Turkish Cypriots changed after 1974."

That statement was published in the newspaper of Denktaş's régime, *Birlik*, on 30 August 1980.

42. It is not true that the Turkish Cypriots were "forced out of the Government". What is true is that the Turkish Cypriot ministers refused from 1964 on to participate in the Council of Ministers in order to show that, as the then Vice-President, Mr. Küçük, put it, "the Republic was dead" and to promote partition. The agenda of the Council of Ministers continued to be sent to Turkish Cypriot ministers at least one year after they chose not to participate, but they insisted in their refusal. The Turkish Cypriot judges remained in their posts until 1966, but they were then forced, under threats of imprisonment by the Turkish leadership, to withdraw, and they acted accordingly. Many Turkish Cypriots in the diplomatic service of the Republic remained in their posts until 1974, just as many Turkish Cypriots who served in the diplomatic missions chose to remain in their positions.

43. Ample evidence of Ankara's policies of segregation and partition is provided by the regular biannual reports of the late Secretary-General U Thant, which demolish the allegations and irrefutably show the falseness of the accusation of mistreatment of the Turkish Cypriot community by the Cyprus Government.

44. As regards the so-called population exchange agreement, which the Turkish side presents as a reason for not complying with the agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979 and for the declaration of their "independence", it would be ironic indeed for anyone to allege that the 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees came to the free areas of the Republic voluntarily. It was the threat of massacre, rape and torture; it was the cruelty of the Turkish forces of invasion; and it was fear of the Turkish tanks and the Turkish bayonets that forced one third of the Cyprus population to abandon their ancestral homes and properties and run to the free areas of the Republic of save their lives.

45. How could the agreement of 2 August 1975 [*see S/11789, annex*] be described as a "population exchange agreement", when in paragraph 2 it was stated:

"Mr. Denktaş reaffirmed, and it is agreed, that the Greek Cypriots at present in the north of the island are free to stay and that they will be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their religion, as well as medical care by their own doctors and freedom of movement in the north"?

How could that agreement be defined as a "population exchange agreement" when, in paragraph 5, it was stipulated:

"In connexion with the implementation of the above agreement, priority will be given to the reunification of families, which may also involve the transfer of a number of Greek Cypriots, at present in the south, to the north"?

In paragraph 4, it also provided that "The United Nations will have free and normal access to Greek Cypriot villages and habitations in the north".

46. What was the outcome of that agreement? The Turkish side immediately violated each and every one of its provisions. A mere look at the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the question of Cyprus will convince everyone of how the Turkish leadership honours its signature. The Greek Cypriots enclaved in the occupied area were forced to leave their homes to join the other Greek Cypriot refugees in the free areas of the Republic. Instead of their being given help to lead a normal life, their situation became miserable. Their education was hampered and so was the practice of their religion; no medical care by their own doctors was allowed and their freedom of movement was hindered.

47. As regards the freedom of movement of UNFICYP in the occupied areas, for nine years now there appears in every biannual report of the Secretary-General a special paragraph devoted to that restriction by the Turkish army. Furthermore, what can we say about paragraph 5 of that agreement, which speaks about the reunification of families of Greek Cypriots and returning them to their ancestral homes in the occupied areas? Not even one such person has been allowed to return. What can we say to Ankara or to its obedient instruments in the occupied area who dare to say: "to speak about the return of refugees to their homes is nothing but a ploy by the Greek Cypriots, meaning that they do not want an agreement"? That arrogant statement came from the mouth of Mr. Atakol, a colleague of Mr. Denktaş, and I present it to the Council as it appeared in the newspaper of Mr. Denktaş, *Birlik*, on 9 October 1982.

48. As regards the so-called economic embargo propaganda of the Turkish side, it is clear that the economic hardships experienced by the Turkish Cypriots are the direct result of the invasion and the occupation and not the legal actions and the obligation of the Cyprus Government to protect, through legal means, the rights of its citizens, whose properties were usurped by the invaders and the settlers transported from Anatolia. The "embargo" allegation is so misleading that even in the minds of the Turkish Cypriots themselves it cannot be substantiated. In the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Kurtulus* of 7 November 1980 it was published that the arguments put forward by Mr. Denktaş "attributing this misery to the... alleged Greek Cypriot embargo are not true". The Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Veziroglu, said, and this was published in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper, *Oncu*:

"The Denktaş-National Unity Party régime has tried to load the blame for all their mistakes, exploitations and lack of success onto the Greeks... On important issues there is no Greek embargo which affects us."

A most recent article on that allegation appeared in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper, *Yeniduzen*, of 21 September 1982:

"To tell the truth no one can convince us that the embargo is the reason for the economic bottlenecks in our area. Most of the economic troubles spring from the type of relations existing between the TFSC"—the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus—"and Turkey.... As long as this régime does not act within the framework of the summit agreements in Cyprus, the situation will not change".

49. Turkey continues to exercise actual and exclusive authority over the occupied areas of Cyprus seized during the invasion by Turkish troops in July and August 1974. It keeps the occupied area under its control through the maintenance of a large force of about 35,000 troops, with about 150 tanks and 80 armoured vehicles. The Turkish troops in the occupied area consist of two regular divisions with all auxiliary units, plus special parachute, commando, air and naval units. They are spread throughout the area in military camps. Columns of Turkish troops constantly patrol the occupied territory and maintain checkpoints on main lines of communication in the same area. The Turkish army is not under the jurisdiction of the so-called TFSC, not even under the jurisdiction of the so-called courts of the TFSC.

50. It is worth mentioning that the Turkish army directly intervenes in matters in the occupied areas, as it did, for example, in strike-breaking and in the seizure, without any prior consultation with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, of 32 Maronite houses in the villages of Asomatos, Karpasia and Kormakiti for Turkish army officers' families in July 1982. The Turkish army has also displaced Turkish Cypriots from their properties in the north. That is stated in the *Press Digest from the North*, quoting *Birlik* of 18 January 1983.

51. The occupied area is so saturated by Turkish troops that the proportion is one soldier for every four members of the population, including women and children. If one takes into account also the 35,000 settlers from Turkey, then the proportion is two Turks from Turkey for every four members of the Turkish Cypriot community. It is thus impossible for any independent action to be taken by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. That leadership in fact expresses the will and policy of Turkey.

52. The Turkish Government, via General Evren, has told Turkish Cypriot political leaders that it claims the

right to intervene directly in Cyprus, it being the responsibility of the Turkish armed forces "to protect the interests and rights of the Turkish nation and that the Turkish armed forces have the right to use this authority everywhere they serve, including Cyprus". That is quoted from *Olay* of 23 August 1982.

53. Furthermore, the so-called Turkish Cypriot Cabinet meetings are attended by a representative of the Turkish occupation force in Cyprus, who gives the final shape to any decision taken by that illegal body. It is worth mentioning that the European Commission of Human Rights has held that sole control over the Turkish occupying forces is vested in the Government of Turkey and that their presence in the occupied area engages Turkey's international responsibility in respect of all persons or property over which they exercise control. That is stated in the report of the Commission in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey, 10 July 1976, page 32; in the decision of 10 July 1978 on the admissibility of Application No. 8007/77; and in the report on Application No. 8007/77, paragraphs 21 and 22.

54. The so-called Turkish Cypriot Security Forces are under the authority and subject to the orders of the General Staff of the Turkish Army, and all expenses for these "Security Forces" are provided by Turkey. Furthermore, the so-called Turkish Cypriot Administration and "Turkish Cypriot Federated State" are subject to the authority and directions of the Turkish Government. They are the products of Turkey's military occupation. They exist only by virtue of the presence of the Turkish forces, which prevent the Government of the Republic of Cyprus from reasserting the Republic's jurisdiction. Any alleged authority exercised by that illegal body is in actual fact derived from the strength of the Turkish Army, to which it is subordinate.

55. That it is Turkey which will take decisions on the solution of the problem and on what concessions will be made in any settlement has been repeatedly stated by Turkish Prime Ministers, such as Mr. Demirel and Mr. Ecevit. Particularly clear examples of statements showing this come from speeches in 1977 by the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erbakan, who, for example, said in April 1977:

> "Cyprus belongs to Turkey and the Greek Cypriots must be content with what Turkish generosity has allowed... there is no chance of ceding an inch in Cyprus... there can be no question of return of Greek Cypriots to their homes... Famagusta and Varosha belong to us. We do not concede an inch, not even one window of a house. Morphou and the surrounding villages belong to us, we do not give back [anything]."

56. Another glaring example is the statement made by Mr. Denktaş himself, published in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Yeniduzen* on 5 October 1982, in which he stated: "Whether I believe it or not, whether I consider it right or not, I do whatever Turkey says". Furthermore, another Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Veziroglu, in a statement published in *Halkin Sesi* of 6 November 1983, accused Denktaş, saying that "a leader who acts like the public servant of Turkey cannot reside in Nicosia but should reside in Ankara". Although Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership are usually careful not openly to acknowledge Turkey's responsibility in the occupied areas of Cyprus, there are politicians who among themselves sometimes pierce the veil and reveal the reality of Turkish control. Evidence in the form of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot newspaper reports shows this reality. Particularly illuminating are articles showing Turkish awareness of the need to obscure Turkish control—see *Milliyet* of 16 June 1982 and *Gunaydin* of 2 November 1982.

57. The major administrative mechanism for Turkish control of the occupied area of Cyprus is by way of the Cyprus Co-ordination Council, previously the Cyprus Affairs Co-ordination Council, now composed of the Turkish Prime Minister, two Deputy Prime Ministers, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, the National Forces Minister of Turkey, the Finance Minister of Turkey, the Industry and Technology Minister of Turkey, the Trade Minister of Turkey, the Construction Minister of Turkey, the Communications Minister of Turkey and the Agriculture and National Resources Minister of Turkey. In addition, each Turkish ministry has a Cyprus Affairs Bureau, while there is a Cyprus Affairs Secretariat in the office of the Turkish Prime Minister, chaired by Mr. Guneri, formerly the Turkish General Officer commanding the Turkish army in Cyprus.

58. There are in the occupied areas large numbers of Turkish civil servants who implement the Cyprus Co-ordination Council's decisions for those areas. The Council takes all economic and social decisions for the occupied part of Cyprus and implements them. This information is derived from Turkish and Turkish Cypriot newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet* of 25 October 1981, *Birlik* of 25 November 1981 and *Hurriyet* of 1 December 1981.

59. Decisions for the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus are taken in Ankara by the Cyprus Co-ordination Council and are then sent to the "TFSC" for final approval, and are thereafter ultimately approved, again by the Cyprus Co-ordination Council in Ankara, and put into effect by that Council. That information was obtained from *Kibris Postasi* of 13 November 1982.

60. The so-called Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus also exercises direct authority in Cyprus, intervening in the decisions of the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus—see *Cumhuriyet* of 22 December 1982; interview with Denktaş as to the "Turkish Ambassador's" intervention.

61. Mr. Denktaş has openly admitted that Turkey has control over the affairs of the occupied areas—in the magazine *Olay* of 19 July 1982 and in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* of 20 December 1982—a view supported by the Turkish Cypriot opposition leaders who have disclosed Turkey's pressures and interference and its disregard for the so-called TFSC Constitution.

62. As regards Turkey's complete financial and political control over the occupied area of Cyprus, this is evidenced by the following. It approves the "TFSC" budget in

Ankara and determines the salaries of the so-called TFSC civil servants. President Evren forced Turkish Cypriot politicians to vote for the "TFSC" budget. As they revealed, having been warned by President Evren, they did not wish to give cause for intervention by the Turkish army. Turkey provides two thirds of the budget of the occupied area. Turkey set up a joint working group under General Guneri, Turkish Chairman of the Cyprus Affairs Secretariat, to prepare an action plan to give direction to the economy of the occupied part of Cyprus, which package was presented to the Turkish Cypriot so-called Cabinet by the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Ulusu. Turkey controls the currency of the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, the Turkish lira being the currency in circulation after the abolition of the Cyprus pound as legal tender, and the State-controlled Agricultural Bank of Turkey acts as the Central Bank for the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

63. The Turkish Tourist Minister has stated, "We do not see the TFSC as a separate country. As part of my duty I visited Cyprus at least 50 times." He also said he thought Turkey's proposed Tourism Encouragement Law would also be enacted to cover the occupied areas.

64. Enver Emin, Secretary-General of Mr. Denktaş's National Unity Party, warned that "TFSC politicians could annihilate us within 24 hours" and that "the TFSC economy stands on its feet only with the assistance provided by Turkey".

65. The formation and composition of the so-called Government of the "TFSC" is in effect shaped by Turkey. Coalition-making over the last two years, as described in the Turkish press, has occurred in accordance with Turkey's dictates. Furthermore decision-making in the occupied areas is under Turkish surveillance and control, and this is evident from the mere fact that three officials from Turkey attend the "TFSC Cabinet" meetings, including the Turkish Ambassador and the head of the security forces.

66. As regards the declaration of a so-called Turkish Cypriot State and Turkey's responsibilities in and absolu. control over the entire occupied territory of Cyprus, most revealing is Mr. Denktaş's recent complaint that recognition of and independence for the so-called TFSC can be sought only "with the approval of Turkey or when Turkey too feels this is necessary". I quote from *Birlik* of 12 February 1983. Mr. Denktaş, commenting on Turkey's control of any such decision, said recently:

> "In the past, even before I pronounced the word [independence], the Turkish Government would choke the word in my mouth. At least this time I am thankful that no such thing was done".

I am quoting from *Milliyet* of 29 May 1983. The leading Turkish newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*, on 18 June 1983 stated that the resolution of self-determination was passed only after Turkish consent.

67. It is evident from the foregoing that, in view of the massive presence of the Turkish army and the total dependence of the occupied area on Turkey, the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus is in reality a puppet wholly controlled by Turkey, and the declaration of the so-called North Cyprus Turkish Republic was adopted with the full knowledge, encouragement and support of Turkey. The recognition of that non-existent State, extended on the same date by the Turkish Government, is indicative of Turkey's involvement and complicity.

68. One of the arguments put forward by the Turkish side was that the internationalization of the Cyprus problem was harming the climate of the intercommunal talks and that that was the main reason for the lack of progress. The Cyprus Government, although it had reservations, decided to put that argument to the test. For three consecutive years it avoided any recourse to the United Nations on the problem of Cyprus, thus demonstrating once again its good will and genuine desire that there be some progress in the intercommunal dialogue. Unfortunately, not only did the deadlock remain but also, through its organs in the occupied area, Ankara took advantage of the time gained to consolidate the *de facto* situation there and to apply new secessionist measures.

69. What is currently one of the main issues, and what this body is legitimately entitled to be informed about, is the Turkish attitude regarding the personal involvement and initiative of the Secretary-General, approved and supported by the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations, as expressed in General Assembly resolution 37/253 of 13 May 1983 on Cyprus.

70. Beginning from their meeting at New Delhi in February this year, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, expressed to the Secretary-General his grave concern and disappointment at the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks and encouraged the Secretary-General to proceed with a new approach, through a personal involvement in the quest for a just and viable solution. President Kyprianou and the Secretary-General met again in Paris a few months later and an exchange of views took place.

71. As the Council well knows, the Secretary-General submitted to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides an informal document containing soundings, as part of his personal initiative, and President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktaş were invited to New York for separate consultations with him. President Kyprianou met the Secretary-General on 14 September, and our response was submitted on 30 September, as requested by him. During that meeting we officially informed him that his personal involvement was welcomed and accepted and that the methodology he proposed was also accepted. We furthermore submitted our response to his soundings in a most constructive manner, and we are very pleased that he himself has, both publicly and privately, described our response "as a positive and constructive step".

72. The Turkish attitude was from the beginning negative. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktaş, postponed

his meeting with the Secretary-General from 16 September to several other days in September, and finally to 28 September. Eventually the meeting took place on 1 October—one day past the time limit. That was the manner chosen by Mr. Denktaş to show the Secretary-General that the meeting was outside the framework of his initiative. Mr. Denktaş rejected the initiative outright, stating to the Secretary-General that he disagreed *in toto* with the methodology and that consequently there was no reason for him to submit any comments on the soundings. Continuing his repeated practice of engaging in what could be described as diversionary tactics, as a way of deflecting attention from the main issue, which is the Secretary-General's initiative, and with the aim apparently of neutralizing it, Mr. Denktaş—to, I believe, everybody's surprise, including the Secretary-General's—made a spectacular proposal to meet with President Kyprianou. It is regrettable that the Turkish Cypriot leader proceeded to connect threats and ultimatums to his proposal. Arriving in Strasbourg from New York, where he met the press, Mr. Denktaş set a three-week time limit for the convening of the meeting with President Kyprianou; otherwise, he threatened to declare a "separate State".

73. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus reacted very firmly in the diplomatic field in all directions to those unacceptable secessionist actions and declared that even a so-called change of name of Mr. Denktaş's fictitious State to "North Cyprus Republic" would be considered by the Cyprus Government as a move equivalent to secession and that we were ready to react appropriately.

74. After Mr. Denktaş's proposal, the Secretary-General held consultations with President Kyprianou. It was understood that Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar was thinking of convening such a meeting only under the usual requirements for the convening of meetings of this kind. These requirements are basic elements for the preparation of such meetings. In the case of Cyprus they were crucial, owing to the fact that a possible failure would have undesirable reprecussions. The requirements are: an agenda to be agreed by the two parties, proper preparation of the meeting and good chances for a successful outcome.

75. Having received the relevant assurances from the Secretary-General, the Cyprus Government agreed to the commencement of consultations for the possible convening of such a meeting.

76. At a time when our side accepted the initiative of the Secretary-General, at a time when the Turkish side blatantly rejected it and at a time when consultations were in progress regarding Mr. Denktaş's own proposal to meet with President Kyprianou, an unwarranted and arbitrary secessionist act was taking place in the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus.

77. On 15 November 1983 the so-called "Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris" purported to declare an independent "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in the territory of the Republic occupied by the military forces of Turkey, thereby attempting to secede and to destroy the territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, a State Member of the United Nations.

78. The situation purportedly created is the direct result of the massive use of force by Turkey in 1974 and the consequent military occupation of 37 per cent of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The actions of Turkey in 1974 and since then, to this very day, have been contrary to the fundamental principles of the prohibition of the use of force and the sovereign equality and the territorial integrity of States. Situations resulting from invasion and occupation should not and could not be recognized by States, as this would be in breach of the principle prohibiting recognition of situations brought about by the illegal threat or use of force.

79. In sum, all the Turkish actions fall squarely within the definition of aggression adopted by the General Assembly in 1974. As the Government of the Republic firmly declared, such illegal activities are also contrary to the numerous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, to the Charter of the United Nations to the international treaties registered with the United Nations and to the peremptory norms of international law.

80. Mr. Denktaş's so-called "Government" and "State" are merely a puppet régime and a puppet entity enjoying whatever degree of effectiveness they possess by virtue of the facts of Turkey's military support and massive financial assistance. In reality Denktaş régime is both maintained and controlled by Turkey and is similar to Manchukuo and to Slovakia and Croatia during the Second World War. Any entity created as a consequence of Turkey's aggression and its fomenting of secession is a nullity. For Turkey to support the Denktaş régime or to tolerate a purported secession is a gross violation of the Final Act of Helsinki. The fruits of aggression and Turkey's breaches of treaties and international law cannot be recognized. Principle IV of the Final Act of Helsinki expressly provides: "No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal."

81. The area of the purported entity continues to be an integral part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, although it is currently under the belligerent occupation of Turkey, which is in breach of its obligations under article II of the Treaty of Guarantee[2] of 1960, whereby Turkey undertook to guarantee the "territorial integrity ... of the Republic" and "the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution", in particular of Article 185, which provides that "the territory of the Republic is one and indivisible and excludes separate independence". Turkey is also in breach of that part of the same article which prohibits "any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly ... partition of the Island".

82. The Turkish Government immediately announced that it recognized the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. By supporting the continuance of the Denktaş régime and the purported secession, Turkey, as I have said, is contravening the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus[3] and the Tready of Guarantee.

83. As the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, has declared, the purported proclamation of independence and secession of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus involves international aggression, direct and indirect, attacks on the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of the Republic of Cyprus, a violation of frontiers and interference in its domestic jurisdiction. The action constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security and creates a most explosive situation in the whole of the eastern Mediterranean area.

84. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is seeking the assistance of the international community in helping the Republic of Cyprus, both in the United Nations and in all other forums, to demand of the Government of Turkey that it take all required measures for the reversal of the unilateral act and that it rescind its recognition of the purported régime.

85. This arbitrary and provocative behaviour and the contemptuous disregard shown by Turkey should be a source of serious concern to the Council, because the situation in Cyprus and its implications, extending beyond the confines of our country and beyond the suffering of its people, endanger international peace and security and at the same time constitute a serious challenge to the effectiveness of the United Nations.

86. My Government, therefore, appeals to the Security Council urgently to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter and to adopt such effective measures as are warranted by the situation, measures which will reverse the unacceptable situation created in the occupied part of Cyprus. We trust furthermore that the Council will give serious consideration to the taking of effective and urgent measures for the implementation of its own mandatory resolutions, in accordance with the Charter and with the Council's own responsibilities and self-respect.

87. I wish to conclude my statement with the following declaration.

88. On 15 November 1983, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community in the Republic of Cyprus made a statement by which he purported to declare the independence of an entity described as the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". The Government of the Republic of Cyprus regards that declaration as a nullity. All States are under the duty and have the obligation not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey is solely responsible for the purported declaration of independence, which would have been impossible had Turkey not been in occupation of that part of the territory of the Republic.

89. Given the political and military control which Turkey exercises in the occupied part of Cyprus—which obviously, in the circumstances, is not independent of Turkey—one arrives at the inescapable conclusion that political, legal and moral responsibility for events in the occupied part of Cyprus lies with the Government of Turkey and will do so until such time as the authority of the Republic is restored in the whole of Cyprus.

90. Accordingly, Turkey is responsible for the breaches of the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic resulting from these latest threats to, *inter alia*, the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, which has been dealt another serious blow. Thus, Turkey is under the obligation to reverse this situation and to restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

91. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr. Yannis Haralambopoulos. I invite him to make his statement.

92. Mr. HARALAMBOPOULOS (Greece): Since this is the first time I am addressing the Council during your presidency, Sir, I should like to express my confidence that under your experienced guidance the Council will discuss the matter on its agenda in a manner which will help peace and justice.

93. Once again, as it has been doing for the past eight years, the Turkish side has flagrantly violated international treaties and has trampled upon fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations. I am referring to the criminal act of the purported declaration of independence of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

94. In 1974, in violation of all norms of international law, the Turkish army invaded the Republic of Cyprus. Since then Turkey has continued to impose its military occupation on a great part of the territory of the Republic, in spite of repeated resolutions of the United Nations calling, in the words of the most recent one, for the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus. For all practical purposes, the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus is totally controlled by Turkey through its army of occupation.

95. It now appears that the already unacceptable state of affairs was not enough for Turkey. Continuing his policies of disregard for international law and morality, Turkey's puppet, Mr. Denktaş, has proceeded to the purported declaration of independence of a so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus occupied by Turkey. Mr. Denktaş chose to do this at the very moment when the representative of the Secretary-General was in Cyprus in order to deliver to him the latest proposal of Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar aimed at furthering the personal involvement of the Secretary-General with a view to achieving a negotiated solution to the problem of Cyprus.

96. The decision which purports to declare the independence of a so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus falls within the context of the continued violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey. More particularly, it is in itself an undeniable breach of the Treaty of Guarantee[2] signed by Turkey along with Greece and the United Kingdom in 1960, whereby Turkey undertook to guarantee the territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus and the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. Article 185 of that

Constitution expressly excludes separatist independence and provides that the territory of the Republic is one and indivisible.

97. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus has just presented the Security Council with a clear and detailed analysis of the recent developments in the Republic of Cyprus. I do not wish to impose on the time of the Council's members by touching again on the history of the question or its legal aspects. Besides, representatives in the Council and their Governments know perfectly well that Turkey has been violating international law continuously in Cyprus, and they know equally well that the so-called declaration of independence of the pseudo-Turkish Cypriot State is just another act in the interminable drama of the occupation of part of the Republic of Cyprus by the Turkish army. It should not be forgotten that the brutal activities of Turkey in the island have only been made possible by its military power. This brutal fact should be borne in mind by the Council and particularly by the countries who help maintain Turkey's military apparatus.

98. Greece, because it is linked to Cyprus by special relations and is one of the guarantors of its sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, will spare no efforts in order to see the end of Turkey's illegal acts against the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the restoration of the Republic's unity in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

99. We call upon all Members of the Organization not only to refrain from affording any form of recognition to this artificial product of illegality and brute force which calls itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, but also to join in unequivocal condemnation of this illegal act. Moreover, we call upon Turkey, whose invasion and continued military occupation of the northern part of the island have created the conditions for such a declaration, immediately to withdraw its army from the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey has the sole responsibility for whatever happens in the northern part of Cyprus because its army of occupation, for all practical purposes, is the sole source of authority in the occupied area.

100. It should be stressed that the continued presence of the Turkish forces in Cyprus re-enforcing Turkey's expansionist aims and illegal actions, compounded by the recent developments which we are here to discuss, run the great risk of creating a highly explosive situation in an area in which international conflicts already abound, thus posing once more a grave threat to international peace and security.

101. Greece declares its intention not to recognize, in the present or in the future, this arbitrary and provocative Turkish act. Greece will continue to pursue its efforts for the re-establishment of freedom and legality in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus with all the means at its disposal.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

NOTES

[1] *Conference on Cyprus: Documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959*, Cmnd. 679 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959).

[2] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475.

[3] *Ibid.*, No. 5476.

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Litho in United Nations, New York 00300 90-60205—August 1992—2,050